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Deliberating across Deep Divides 
Deeply divided societies, like those of Bosnia, Lebanon, and Northern Ireland—riven by 
ethnic, national, religious, linguistic, or other divisions severe enough to threaten the very 
existence or nature of the state, often accompanied by civil violence—would seem infertile 
ground for mass deliberation.  It may not even be possible to get people on opposing sides in the 
same room.  If they do meet they may not really deliberate.  They may not trust one another.  
They may not listen with an open mind.  They may regard the other side’s arguments as insincere 
cover for sectional interests.  They may have an all too vivid sense of what the other side wants 
but not see how it could reasonably want it.  In Rawlsian terms, they may have trouble viewing 
each other as reasonable people engaging in reasonable disagreements (Rawls 1996, pp. 54-58).  
There may be ‘enclave deliberation’, among people on the same side.  But enclave deliberation, 
apart from not spanning the society, may only deepen the lines of division (as Sunstein’s (2009) 
work on polarization suggests).   
 Instead, the most common prescriptions for deeply divided societies have centered on 
political elites and the institutions structuring their interactions (see O’Flynn 2007).  In the 
‘integrative approach’, electoral engineering incentivizes compromise by enabling moderates on 
each side to cooperate without getting punished by their own supporters at the polls for 
appearing weak (Horowitz 1991; Reilly 2001).  In ‘consociational democracy’ (Lijphart 1977; 
O’Leary 2005), opposing elites share governmental power, make pragmatic bargains, and seek to 
sell them to their supporters.  These elite-centered strategies may increase stability and decrease 
violence.  But their focus is on managing the conflict, rather than resolving it, and on facilitating 
‘peaceful coexistence’, rather than moving toward a more unified democracy without deep 
division.    
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 Is more possible?  We believe some hope may lie in mass deliberation after all—at least 
under the right conditions and by a manageably sized but representative subset of the whole 
population. Ordinary citizens may actually have less intractably opposing views than the elites 
who speak for them, and the experience of grappling together with policy issues may both help 
them to see this and bring their views still closer.  It may also, perhaps still more importantly, 
reduce their levels of mutual hostility and distrust.  In turn, an event demonstrating all this may 
encourage elite-level compromise—emboldening moderates while making it harder for 
hardliners to ‘play the ethnic card’.  
 This article examines a Deliberative Poll (DP) in the Omagh District Council area of 
Northern Ireland, a society only recently emerged from protracted, systemic violence, reflecting 
and reinforcing the deep divide between Catholics and Protestants.
1
 A random sample were 
interviewed, then invited to gather to discuss policy issues, under conditions facilitating a free 
and civil exchange of views (see below). The topic—one heavily impinged by the Catholic-
Protestant divide—was the future of the local schools.   
 The results suggest that a representative sample, including both Catholics and Protestants, 
can be assembled to discuss policy issues; that, once assembled, they have enough in common to 
permit meaningful and constructive deliberation; that they tend to emerge better informed about 
the policies under discussion; that their policy attitudes often change as they learn, think, and talk 
about the issues; that at least some of those changes tend to be in the direction of policies 
involving greater religious mixing and otherwise plausibly serving the interests of the society as 
a whole; and that the opposing sides tend to grow more respectful and trusting of each other.  But 
let us examine the DP, the context, and the results more closely.    
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The Issues 
 Beyond requiring all schools receiving state funding to deliver the same academic 
curriculum, the educational system in Northern Ireland has largely taken ‘segmental autonomy’ 
(Lijphart 1977) as a given.  In only a small minority of schools is there any significant mix of 
Catholic and Protestant pupils.  More than 90% of the schools are either state-controlled (48%) 
or Catholic-maintained (43%), and only 4.9% of the pupils attending state-controlled schools are 
Catholic, while only 1% of those attending Catholic-maintained schools are Protestant 
(Department of Education 2007a).  Fewer than 10% of the schools are either formally Integrated 
(4%) or under other forms of management (5%).
2
 
 Two practical constraints, however, are forcing schools to consider greater coordination 
or consolidation.  The first is curricular.  Recent legislation requires all post-primary schools to 
adopt the new ‘entitlement framework’, aiming to place greater emphasis on work-skills, to offer  
a wider range of learning opportunities, and to give pupils greater flexibility in choosing from 
that range.  Schools must offer 24 subjects for pupils aged 14-16 and 27 for pupils aged 16-19 to 
choose from.  At least one third of those subjects must be academic, and at least one third 
technical or vocational, with the remaining third left to the discretion of the school (Department 
of Education 2005b).  Many schools will have trouble meeting these requirements on their own.   
 The second constraint is demographic.  Declining birth rates have meant declining 
numbers of pupils entering the schools.  The entering enrolment has been dropping by about 2 
per cent per year.  Many schools are short of pupils.  Thus the government-commissioned 
Independent Strategic Review of Education recommended making ‘collaborative approaches to 
the sharing of facilities and resources … standard practice, while ensuring that the particular 
identity or ethos of an individual school is preserved wherever possible’ (Department of 
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Education, 2007b, p. 116).   
The Omagh Deliberative Poll 
 The Omagh DP was held on January 27, 2007.  Omagh, a district council area of nearly 
48,000 inhabitants in County Tyrone, made sense for several reasons.
3
  It has a mixed population 
of Catholics and Protestants.
  
Its primary and post-primary schools represent all the major school 
types.  Some have mainly Catholic pupils, some have mainly Protestant pupils, and a few have 
pupils more evenly split between the two communities.  The schools range in size from small to 
large (from roughly 200 to nearly 1,000 pupils at the post-primary level).  As in Northern Ireland 
as a whole, the birthrate and thus the school-age population are declining.  And, finally, the 
availability of a large piece of public land, formerly used as a British Army barracks, made a 
shared campus a real possibility (Department of Education 2007c). 
 The design was the usual Deliberative Polling design (see, e.g., Luskin, Fishkin, and 
Jowell 2002, Fishkin and Luskin 2005, or Fishkin 2009).  A random sample of parents were 
interviewed, then assembled to discuss the future of the local schools.
4
  Those agreeing to attend 
were sent balanced briefing documents conveying relevant factual information, outlining the 
policy options, and sketching the arguments for and against them.  The discussion took place in 
randomly-assigned small groups, numbering about ten participants apiece.  The small group 
sessions alternated with plenary sessions providing the participants with the opportunity to 
question panels of policy experts and policy makers.   
 The small group discussions were led by moderators trained to intervene only neutrally 
and as little as possible. There was no push toward (or away from) consensus; the participants 
were explicitly told that they need not agree on anything, that they might come to agree either 
more or less over the course the day (an element of the DP design predating but consistent with 
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Karpowitz and Mansbridge 2005 and Neisser 2006).  The combination of random assignment 
and random sampling meant that they found themselves talking to others of widely varying 
backgrounds and views—from other walks of life, as well as from the other community.  They 
took no votes, made no decisions; at the end, they simply completed an augmented version of the 
same questionnaire as on first contact.  
 The initial interview sample consisted of 568 parents of school age children in the Omagh 
area, interviewed in early January, 2007 (T1).
5
 All were then invited to attend the deliberations, 
and 127 eventually participated, of whom 121 completed the post-deliberation (T2) 
questionnaire. The interviewing and recruitment (of interviewees to attend the event) occupied a 
shorter than usual period, which may have had some effect on the participant sample, as we 
speculate below.    
 The briefing materials were drafted in consultation with representatives of all the 
organizations responsible for managing Omagh’s schools, namely the Department of Education, 
the Council for Catholic Maintained Schools, the Northern Ireland Council for Integrated 
Education, the Western Education and Library Board (the local schools authority), Comhairle Na 
Gaelscolaíochta (Council for Irish Language Schools), the Trustees of the Christian Brothers, 
and the Trustees of Loreto Convent.  The expert panel consisted of representatives from the same 
management interests, plus the Community Relations Council of Northern Ireland.   
 For the briefing materials, these stakeholders only had to agree on a menu of competing 
policy options, along with the advantages claimed by each option’s supporters and disadvantages 
claimed by each option’s opponents.  Most, indeed, strongly opposed varying subsets of the 
options, and even achieving agreement on the overall menu and description of claimed 
advantages and disadvantages was a challenge.  Similarly, getting representatives of all the 
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stakeholder groups to participate in the expert panels was difficult, and there remained some 
suspense, down to the day the event, as to whether they would all show up.
6
      
 Portions of the proceedings were recorded and broadcast by BBC Northern Ireland as a 
way of exposing the broader public to the discussion and inducing public officials to heed the 
results.  The event was also covered, to varying degrees, by the local, national, and international 
press.  
Representativeness 
 A preliminary question is the extent to which the participants can reasonably be taken to 
represent all parents of school-age children in the Omagh area.  Two main sorts of comparison 
are possible: (1) of the participants directly with the population of Omagh, on those variables for 
which Northern Ireland Neighborhood Information Service (NINIS)  data are available, as they 
are for many sociodemographic characteristics, and (2) of the participants with the 
‘nonparticipants’ (the interviewees who took the T1 questionnaire but did not attend the 
discussions), on those variables, including all beliefs and attitudes, for which census data are 
unavailable.
7
  
 The participant sample looks highly representative in most respects—perhaps most 
importantly, with respect to religious background and national identification.  Protestants 
constitute a slightly larger share (33.9%), and Catholics a slightly smaller one (62.8%) of the 
participants than of the population (29.7% and 69.1%, respectively), but these differences are 
small and statistically insignificant. National identification is not available from the NINIS, but 
the participants differ from the non-participants scarcely at all in that respect. Among the 
participants, 27.4% considered themselves to be nationalist, 15.3% considered themselves to be 
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unionist, and 54.5% said they were ‘neither’. The corresponding percentages for the non-
participants were 25.7%, 10.6%, and 57.9%.
8
  
 Also importantly, the participant sample is highly representative with respect to both 
school policy and inter-community attitudes.  The participants and nonparticipants differ 
significantly on only 4 of 17 school policy attitude items (described below) and 1 of 18 inter-
community attitude items (also described below).  While our participants were more pro- than 
anti-mixing and more positive than negative in their perceptions of the other side—the 
nonparticipants were too.  As have been the samples in other surveys (of Northern Ireland as a 
whole, not just Omagh).
9
 These initial attitudes may surprise some readers, and we shall discuss 
them further below, but they do appear to be representative.     
 Two demographic biases do need discussing.  The smaller concerns education.  The 
participants were distinctly better educated than the population, with 19.5%, versus 14.4% of the 
population at the degree level or higher and 22.0%, versus 44.2% of the population having no 
formal qualification.  These numbers, however, are not fully comparable.  Given the trends in 
aggregate education levels, the population from which we sampled (parents of school-aged 
children, almost entirely in their 20s, 30s, or 40s) is better educated than the one to which the 
census data refer (‘household reference persons’ aged 16 to 74), making some though probably 
not all of the bias suggested by the numbers just reported illusory. The larger bias concerns 
gender.  Far too many of the participants (75.8%, versus 49.9% in the population) were women. 
Since gender roles in Northern Ireland remain largely traditional, the mothers in the sample may 
simply have been more interested than the fathers in being interviewed about school policy.
10
   
 There is no real evidence, however, that either bias made much difference.  The 
participants with no formal qualification, with a secondary level qualification, and at the degree 
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level or higher all changed their views in the same ways (in the same direction, to the same 
degree).  So did the male and female participants.  The online Appendix B gives the details.  To 
be sure, the overrepresentation of women and the well educated could still have affected the 
small group discussions in ways that made the attitude changes for both men and women or for 
all education levels larger (or smaller) than they would have been with fewer female or well 
educated participants.  But there is also scant evidence of that.  The small groups in which at 
least  80% of the participants were women changed in the same ways as those in which fewer 
than 80% of the participants were women, and those in which  at least 80% of the participants 
had secondary level qualification or higher changed in the same ways as those in which fewer 
than 80% of the participants did so. Again the online Appendix B provides the details.      
Questions and Hypotheses 
 Without attempting too precise a definition, we take deliberation to be a form of 
elevated—serious, substantive, and open-minded—discussion (see Fishkin and Luskin 2005 for 
more).  It could, in principle, concern matters of fact (as in jury deliberations), rather than 
courses of action, but in our view the most important sort of deliberation, and that with which we 
are concerned here, is part of ‘deliberative democracy’—deliberation about policy or electoral 
choices.  The goal is to enable the participants to refine their individual policy preferences and 
the reasoning behind them, not merely (or necessarily, though we do expect it) to transform their 
perceptions of others.
11
   
 The evidence from past DPs suggests that deliberation frequently changes policy 
attitudes, both at the individual level (‘gross change’) and in the aggregate (‘net change’); 
induces considerable learning, which has often been linked to the policy attitude changes; and 
fosters ‘better citizenship’—more participatory attitudes and behaviors, greater acceptance of 
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political differences, and the like (see, e.g., Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell 2002; Fishkin and 
Luskin 2005, Luskin and Fishkin 2002; Luskin, Fishkin, and Hahn 2007b; Luskin, Sood, 
Fishkin, and Kim 2009).     
 But these results were not from deeply divided societies, where mass deliberation is 
widely thought to be impracticable, if not impossible (e.g., Mouffe 1999, O’Leary 2005, 
McGarry & O’Leary 2009).  Does deliberation produce similar learning and policy attitude 
change in deeply divided societies?  Even on issues closely related to a deep divide, like many 
educational issues in Northern Ireland?  Can deliberation across deep divides induce some 
greater appreciation of the other side and its point of view?  Can it (whatever in this vein it may 
require) create greater mutual trust and understanding?   
We expect our data to answer in the affirmative. At least under the sort of safe, fair, and 
facilitative conditions provided by a DP, we expect to find that ordinary people will have enough 
in common to engage in meaningful deliberation—even in this deeply divided society. This 
much is admittedly a matter of faith (no pun intended) more than reasoned expectation (although 
we obviously know the answer as we write).  
But, given that much, we further expect deliberation to have something like its usual 
effects, if possibly in somewhat weaker than usual degree. The participants should learn about 
the issues under discussion, and that learning, coupled with the exposure to other points of view 
and the occasion to think harder about the issues, should in many cases change their policy 
attitudes.  Other expectations are less certain. Some concern the nature of any policy attitude 
change.  Policies involving or implying more mixing of Catholic and Protestant pupils could 
either gain or lose support, to the extent that the deliberation either strengthens or weakens 
negative inter-group attitudes and perceptions or makes them seem either more or less relevant to 
10 
 
the choice between policy alternatives. Proposals unrelated to the Catholic-Protestant divide may 
similarly, for reasons harder to anticipate, either gain or lose support.  Other uncertainties 
concern the effects on the differences between Catholic and Protestant participants.  Will they 
change in the same direction?  Will the gap between them shrink or widen (will they converge or 
diverge)? Will they wind up on the same side of the issue? How far apart? We shall see.  
 Finally, there are the possible effects on the participants’ attitudes about the conflict, the 
other side, and the value and possibility of peaceful accommodation. These could be negative.  
Heated disagreement could stoke hostility and reinforce negative stereotypes. But we expect 
them to be largely positive.  Talking with others in a safe public space about issues related but 
not always reducible to the deep divide may increase perceptions of the other side’s 
trustworthiness and openness to reason. Other DPs have produced effects of this general sort 
(references deleted), although deep divisions may pose a sterner test. 
The School Policy Issues 
The Omagh school policy attitude items fall into four main clusters.
12
  Ordered by ease of 
extrication from the Catholic-Protestant divide, beginning with the most easily extricated, these 
are:  
 Age-Groupings.  Four items asked about the ideas of having mostly schools for ages 11-
18, with some schools for ages 11-16 (the status quo); of having most schools be for ages 11-16, 
while converting one or two schools into 16-18 Sixth Form Colleges; of switching to a system of 
junior and senior high schools for ages 11-14 and 14-18, respectively; and of having schools 
combining primary and post-primary pupils (for ages 7-14, for example).  Note that supporting 
the first idea (again, the status quo) implies opposing the other three, while supporting any of the 
latter implies opposing the former.   
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   School Types.  Another three items concern possible sortings of schools by ability or 
subject matter.  These ask about the ideas of having both academic schools and technical/ 
vocational schools (essentially the status quo, since, de facto, grammar schools are academic, 
while comprehensive schools are vocational); of having a system of specialist schools (e.g., for 
language, science, or technology); and of having a system of all-ability schools, all providing the 
same broad curriculum.   
School Collaboration.  Four items concern the ways in which existing schools might 
collaborate.  They ask about the possibilities of schools’ sharing facilities like technology labs or 
sixth forms; of their sharing a campus while retaining distinct identities; of pupils’ traveling to 
neighboring schools to be taught subjects unavailable at their own; and of teachers’ traveling to 
neighboring schools to teach subjects unavailable there.  
 Religious Mixing.  Finally, six items raise the possibility of mixing Catholic and 
Protestant pupils in the same classroom.  Two raise it somewhat obliquely, asking about the 
ideas of retaining all the existing school types in the Omagh area (the status quo)
13
 and of 
establishing schools jointly managed by the Catholic Church and the Western Education and 
Library Board or Protestant churches.  Nominally, these items concern school organization rather 
than mixing, but both carry clear implications for mixing—negative in the first case, positive in 
the second.  The remaining four items raise the issue more directly.  They ask about the ideas of 
requiring schools needing to partner to deliver the new curriculum to partner with their closest 
neighboring school, even if not of the same religious composition; of requiring unmixed schools 
to partner with a school containing children of the other religion; of at least sometimes teaching 
the pupils from partnering schools of differing religious composition in the same classroom; and 
of increasing the number of formally Integrated schools, in which all parties responsible for the 
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managing education, including the Churches and the Education and Library Board, have a right 
to play a role.  
Inter-Community Beliefs and Attitudes 
 Here we have measures of each side’s perceptions of the other’s trustworthiness and 
openness to reason; how positively or negatively they feel toward one another; their agreement 
or disagreement that ‘mixed education promotes mutual respect and understanding’ and their views on 
the importance of children’s ‘attend[ing] school only with other children of their own religion’ 
versus ‘attend[ing] schools that have a balanced enrollment of Protestant and Catholic pupils,’ 
the extent to which ‘changes in the Omagh area’s education system can equally benefit’ both 
Catholic and Protestant children versus being inevitably zero-sum, and the extent to which 
‘better relations between Protestants and Catholics will only come about through more mixing of 
the two communities’ versus ‘only com[ing] about through more separation’     
Results 
Knowledge  
 The questionnaire contained seven factual knowledge items relating to education in 
Northern Ireland generally and Omagh specifically.  These asked about the percentage of schools 
having a majority of one religion but at least 10% of the other in their enrollment (5-10%); the 
percentage change over the past five years in the number of children entering Omagh schools (a 
10% decrease); the minimum number of subjects 14-year-old pupils must have the opportunity 
of choosing under the new entitlement framework (24); the proportion of the subjects offered 
that must be ‘applied’ under the entitlement framework (1/3); the proportion of grammar-school 
pupils going on to university (roughly 3/4); the relationship between age and funding (greater for 
older pupils); and the official employer for voluntary grammar school teachers (the school’s 
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Board of Governors).  
 Table 1 shows that the participants learned a great deal.  Across the seven knowledge 
items, the percentage answering correctly soared from 21.8% to 50.3%, a gain of 28.6%. On six 
of the seven, the gain was statistically significant, and on some it was night-and-day. The 
percentage correctly identifying a menu of at least 24 subjects for all 14-year-old pupils as one of 
(Table 1 about here) 
the new curricular requirements rose from 21.0% to 75.0%, the percentage knowing that schools 
receive more funding for older than for younger pupils from 22.6% to 79.0%.       
Policy Attitudes and Attitude Change 
 We examine two broad questions about these school policy attitudes: (1) where they 
wound up and (2) how they changed to get there.  To maximize comparability, we linearly 
translate all our policy attitude items to the 0-1 interval, with 0 representing the strongest 
opposition, 1 the strongest support, and .5 neutrality.
14
  In these terms, (1) is a question of the T2 
mean 2  ( > .5 for support, < .5 for opposition), while (2) is a question of the difference of the 
T2 and T1 means 2 1   ( > 0 when attitudes become more supportive, < 0 when they become 
more opposed).  The answers (1) paint a picture of what a more deliberative public might think 
and (2) suggest how deliberation has changed that picture from what it would otherwise have 
been (and thus also, albeit less certainly, how further deliberation might change it further).   
 Table 2 shows the results.  Without exception, the mean opinion falls distinctly to one 
side or the other of each issue.  With only one exception, that side represents support for 
whatever the item text proposed—in three cases the status quo, in the rest departures from it (a 
half dozen of them involving more religious mixing).  This may suggest some acquiescence bias, 
but the strong support, even at T1, for all but one of the proposals for increased religious mixing 
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is actually consistent with other survey results, which have routinely shown majorities wishing to 
send their children to mixed schools and wanting to see the number of such schools increase 
(NILT 2010; Taylor, 2001, p. 43; Hadden and Boyle 1994, p. 33).  That our more concrete 
proposals in that direction also draw high levels of support suggests that these attitudes are real, 
and more than just vague aspiration.
15
    
 On 5 of the 17 items, there was statistically significant and substantively important  
(Table 2 about here) 
attitude change.
16
 To help benchmark the numbers, note that if one-and-a-half times as many 
participants (say 24% versus 16%) move twice as far (two response categories versus one) in one 
direction as in the other on a classic five-point agree-disagree scale—quite a notable aggregate 
shift in the one direction—that corresponds to a net change of .08 on the 0-1 scale to which all 
these items have been translated (reference deleted).  In this light, two of these changes (on 
schools sharing a campus while retaining distinct identities and requiring partnering with the 
nearest neighboring school, regardless of religious composition) were quite notable (.070 and 
.078, ignoring the signs), and another three (on retaining all school types currently in the Omagh 
area, keeping the traditional pattern of schools for ages 11-18 and 11-16, and having most 
schools 11-16 while converting one or two into 16-18 Sixth Form Colleges) very big (between 
.096 and .119 in magnitude).  
 These changes are mainly of two overlapping sorts.  Four of the five show either 
decreased support for the status quo or increased support for departures from it, probably 
reflecting increased recognition of the demographic and curricular constraints previously noted.  
The lone exception was the most ambitious version of school collaboration, the idea of getting 
schools to share a campus while still retaining distinct identities, support for which ebbed by 
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.078.  Our surmise is that this struck many respondents as an awkward and taxing arrangement.   
 More importantly, two of the five changes show increased support for policies entailing 
increased religious mixing or decreased support for policies not doing so.  Two of the six 
religious mixing items thus changed in a pro-mixing direction.  Support for requiring schools to 
partner with the closest neighboring school, regardless of religious composition increased, while 
support for retaining all existing school types, which would limit any increase in religious 
mixing, declined. 
Catholic versus Protestant Policy Attitudes and Attitude Change 
The same two broad questions—(1) where they wound up and (2) how they changed to 
get there—may be asked about the school policy attitudes within each community.  But here 
three additional questions comparing the communities also arise: (3) how close or far apart they 
wound up, (4) whether their attitudes changed in the same or opposite directions, and (5) to what 
extent they converged or diverged.  If the Catholic and Protestant means are 1C and 1P  at T1 
and 2C  and 2P  at T2, (3) is a question of 2 2C P  , (4) a question of the sign of  
( 2 1C C  )( 2 2P P  ) (positive when the groups change in the same direction, negative when 
they change in opposite directions, and 0 when either does not change), and (5) a question of the 
sign of 1 1 2 2C P C P       (positive when the groups converge, negative when they diverge, 
and 0 when they remain the same distance apart).  Note that any combination of answers to (4)  
and (5) is possible.  Changes in the same direction can produce either convergence or divergence 
depending on their relative magnitudes, as can changes in opposite directions, depending on the  
(Figure1 about here) 
closeness of the starting points, the directions of the changes (toward or away from the other 
16 
 
group’s starting point), and their combined magnitude.  See Figure1.     
 Table 3 addresses these questions, presenting the means for Catholics (C), Protestants 
(P), and the difference between them (P - C) at T1, at T2, and as they changed from T1 to T2.  Its 
(Table 3 about here) 
last column also presents the change in the absolute distance between the two groups, a measure 
of how much they diverged (when the entry is positive) or converged (when it is negative).     
 The short answer to (1), and, in large measure, to (2) – (5) is that Catholics and 
Protestants resembled each other (and thus the sample as a whole).  On every single item, 
Protestants and Catholics both started and wound up on the same side of the scale (the supportive 
side, on every item but one).  On six of the 17 items, there is some perceptible gap at T2, but 
only one of those differences (on retaining all existing school types) is statistically significant (p 
< .05, two-tailed), and only one more (on establishing schools jointly managed by the Catholic 
Church and the Western Education and Library Board or Protestant churches) is relatively close 
(p = .090).  The Protestants emerged less supportive of retaining all existing school types—
making them, in that respect, more pro-mixing—but also less supportive of establishing jointly 
managed schools—making them, in that respect, less pro-mixing.  More generally, there is no 
particular pattern to the directions of these generally modest differences, with Protestants falling 
to the pro-status quo or pro-mixing side of Catholics on some but to the opposite side on others.   
 The T1-to-T2 changes, too, were similar in both sign and magnitude.  On none of the 17 
items did Catholics and Protestants change significantly in opposite directions.  On every one of 
the six items on which at least one of the groups changed significantly, the other changed either 
not at all (in one case) or in the same direction (in the other five, significantly or almost 
significantly in two).  On a seventh item, both groups changed almost significantly (p = .063 and 
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.124) in the same direction.  The degree of change differed significantly only on the idea of 
having both academic and technical/vocational schools, of which Protestants became much less 
supportive (moving away from the status quo), while Catholics stood pat.  On three other items, 
the differences between the groups’ attitude changes did approach significance (p < .10):  
Protestants again became much less supportive of having a system of specialist schools, while 
Catholics again stood pat; and both Protestants and Catholics became less supportive of both 
getting pupils to travel to nearby schools for subjects unavailable at their own and retaining all 
existing school types, but unequally so, with the decrease in support being greater among 
Catholics in the first case and greater among Protestants in the second.   
 Nor, finally, did these changes produce any routine convergence or divergence.  The 
mean |P - C|, across the 17 items, is only .004.  Taking .080 as a cutoff suggests only two notable 
cases of divergence, and only one of convergence.  The communities diverged on the ideas of 
keeping the traditional pattern of schools for ages 11-18 and 11-16 and of retaining all existing 
school types.  In both cases, initially equal and very high levels of support declined in both 
communities, but more sharply among Protestants.  The communities converged on the idea of 
getting pupils to travel to nearby schools for subjects unavailable at their own.  Initially high 
levels of support declined in both communities, but more among the Protestants, who were 
initially more supportive.
17
  But these are exceptions.  In the main, Catholics and Protestants 
changed their views (to the extent they did so) roughly in tandem.   
Inter-Community Beliefs and Attitudes 
 At least on the surface, the participants had mostly positive views of one another, even at 
the outset.  The T1 means in Table 4A suggest that both Catholics and Protestants felt much  
(Table 4 about here) 
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more favorably than unfavorably toward the other community (.768 and.654, respectively).  Each 
also saw the other as somewhat more open to reason than not (Catholics at .543 regarding 
Protestants, Protestants at .560 regarding Catholics) and distinctly more trustworthy than not 
(Catholics at .621 regarding Protestants, Protestants at .642 regarding Catholics).  Granted, these 
means may overstate the degree of positivity.  Sizable numbers of respondents gave midpoint 
responses (neither trustworthy/open to reason/favourable nor untrustworthy/not open to 
reason/unfavorable) in characterizing the other side, and there is reason to suspect most of those 
responses of representing veiled antipathy.
18
  But positive responses far outnumbered overtly 
negative ones, by factors ranging from 1.3:1 to 8:1, and even treating say three-fourths of the 
midpoint responses as de facto negative would leave relatively even T1 splits between positive 
and negative perceptions—more positive distributions than might have been expected in a 
“deeply divided” society.       
 Table 4B shows that both communities also tended to endorse empirical premises 
consistent with peaceful accommodation, agreeing overwhelmingly that ‘mixed education 
promotes mutual respect and understanding’ (Catholics at .776, Protestants at .825), that it is 
important for children to ‘attend schools that have a balanced enrollment of Protestant and 
Catholic pupils’ (Catholics at .722, Protestants at .746), and that ‘better relations between 
Protestants and Catholics will only come about through more mixing of the two communities’ 
(Catholics at .669, Protestants at .770).  Only the proposition that ‘changes in the Omagh area’s 
education system can equally benefit’ both Catholic and Protestant children drew somewhat less 
agreement—but still more agreement than disagreement (with Catholics at .545, Protestants at 
.627).   
 As noted above, these results are consistent with the single-time snapshots of similarly 
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general mixing-related attitudes in other surveys, as well as with the more concrete mixing-
friendly T1 school policy attitudes reported in Table 2.  There is some opposition toward mixing 
and the other side, but much less than ”deeply divided” suggests.  This looks like division, but 
not one that is all that deep.  Is Northern Ireland actually characterized by deep division?  Yes, 
we believe—but among elites and activists, we suspect, much more than among ordinary 
citizens.  More of that presently.  
 Although  these high initial means limited the room for upward movement, several of 
these attitudes did become more positive.  In Table 4A, Catholics came to see Protestants as 
much more open to reason than they had before deliberating (increasing their mean rating by 
.117, from .543 to .660), and each community came to see the other as trustworthier than they 
had before deliberating (with Protestants increasing their mean rating of Catholics by .069, from 
.642 to .711, and Catholics increasing their mean rating Protestants by .087, from .621 to .709).  
In Table 4B, the belief commanding the weakest initial agreement—that changes in the 
education system can equally benefit children from both communities—drew significantly more 
agreement, especially on the part of Catholics, who had more room to agree more. 
 Granted, each side saw the other’s attitudes as less positive than they actually were and, 
with one exception, did not change those perceptions much.  Table 4C shows the six mean 
perceptions (of the holding of three beliefs by each of the two sides) for which we have these 
measures.  Five of the six start insignificantly different from neutrality, and the sixth (of 
Catholics’ perceptions of the importance Protestants place on children’s attending a school with 
balanced enrolment) starts below it.  At least, that was the one significant change.  After 
deliberating, the Catholics saw Protestants as much more interested in balanced enrolments than 
they did initially—just as much in favor as the Protestants saw them as being.   
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Discussion 
 Mass deliberation in deeply divided societies has often been dismissed as impossible or 
undesirable.  As O’Leary (2005, p. 10) puts it, ‘those who embrace a politics of deliberative 
democracy as the prescription for conflict need reminding that deliberation takes place in 
languages, dialects, accents and ethnically toned voices and that it is not possible to create “ideal 
speech situations”’.  Even mundane policy issues may be inextricably related to the larger 
struggle for the state, leading even those who ‘express tolerant preferences’ to ‘practice 
suspicion’ (McGarry & O’Leary 2009, p. 68).  Thus ordinary people deliberating across deep 
divides may either fail to deliberate or deliberate but divide further.    
 The Omagh DP was only one deliberative forum, in only one district council area, on 
only one topic, but its results give grounds for believing this too gloomy a view.  In the first 
place, we were able to assemble a more or less representative microcosm of Omagh, itself 
something of a microcosm of Northern Ireland.  Once assembled, moreover, the participants did 
deliberate.  They exchanged views.  They learned about the issues.  This probably did require 
some threshold levels of mutual trust, respect, and understanding, but our T1 results, consistent 
with those from surveys of Northern Ireland as a whole, suggest that many ordinary Catholics 
and Protestants are past that threshold, holding relatively pro-mixing attitudes and neutral-to-
positive perceptions of the other side.  
 Does that mean that Northern Ireland is not actually ‘deeply divided’ ?  Not necessarily.  
It may be becoming less deeply divided, as it becomes more peaceful.  But these results also 
suggest that the nature of ‘deep divisions’ may need reconsidering.  They may not always or 
even usually be particularly great among ordinary citizens, focused as they tend to be on getting 
on with their everyday lives.  It only takes a modest percentage of the population to engage in the 
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sort of violence characterizing ‘the troubles’.  Are the attitudes and perceptions held by elites or 
activists as conducive to deliberation (as distinct from bargaining) as those held by ordinary 
citizens?  A good deal of work in psychology leads us to suspect not. As a rule, attitude 
extremity is an increasing function of interest, thought, and knowledge (all traits on which elites 
and activists are characteristically high), provided that the perceived attributes of the attitude 
object (in this case, the other side and anything associated with it) are correlated, as is surely the 
case in Northern Ireland.  (For the psychological theory and evidence, see, e.g. Judd and Lusk 
1984, Tesser et al. 1995.)   At the very least, our results suggest the desirability of parallel studies 
of ordinary citizens, activists, and elites to see where, in a given society, the divisions are deeper 
versus shallower.   
 The participants’ policy attitudes confirmed a serious coming-to-terms with the new 
demographic and curricular constraints.  Both before and after deliberating, the participants 
mostly supported the proposals for school policy changes—some entailing more mixing—and 
there is reason to regard this support as genuine, if in some cases merely pragmatic.  It was clear 
from the demographic and curricular constraints described above that changes were imminent, 
the issues of what those changes should be had received wide public discussion before the DP, 
and these were concrete proposals being considered by the policy-makers answering questions in 
the plenary sessions.  Granted, two more general status quo proposals (of keeping the traditional 
pattern of schools for ages 11-18 and 11-16 and of retaining all school types currently in the 
Omagh area) also drew distinctly more support than opposition, suggesting some mix of 
acquiescence bias, limited recognition of apparent inconsistencies, and implicit nuance.  But the 
support for these status quo proposals sharply declined, suggesting that the high—and, by 
contrast, steady or increasing—support for the proposals involving change was real.   
22 
 
 More importantly, there was also some increased support for religious mixing—
implicitly in the reduced support for retaining all school types currently in the Omagh area and 
explicitly in the increased support for getting schools to partner with the closest neighboring 
school, regardless religious composition, if necessary to deliver the curriculum. The support for 
the other proposals relating to religious mixing, while not increasing, started and ended high.  
Deliberating did not lead Catholics and Protestants to agree (or disagree) more about these 
policies, though largely because their views were already (and remained) surprisingly similar.   
 Similarly, some of the participants’ perceptions of the other community became still 
more positive, as did some of their beliefs regarding inter-community relations. Protestants came 
to see Catholics as trustworthier than they had, while Catholics came to see Protestants as both 
trustworthier and more open to reason than they had.  The sample as a whole came to agree more 
with the proposition that changes in the -educational system can benefit children from both 
communities equally (although the movement was concentrated among Catholics).   
 In context, these results are encouraging.  The Omagh DP was a relatively modest 
intervention, consisting of just one day of organized, balanced deliberation, preceded by just a 
few days to a few weeks of at-home, mostly imbalanced learning and discussion set in motion by 
the invitation to participate.  Not much, considering.  Northern Ireland has only recently begun to 
emerge from decades of hostility, punctuated by serious violence, and its schools have arguably 
been one of the vehicles for reproducing the opposing cultures.  On the assumptions of those 
dismissing the possibility of constructive mass deliberation in such settings, the Omagh DP 
might never have happened.  Given that it happened, it could have been expected to have 
negligible or divisive effects on the participants’ attitudes toward school policy issues and one 
`another.  In fact, however, there were some sizable effects—and in the direction of attitudes 
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tending to make the society less deeply divided.         
 We hesitate to suggest that deliberative public fora like DPs can be the key to a more 
conciliatory politics, but, to the extent that political elites pay them heed, they may be capable of 
playing a part.  Results resembling those of the Omagh DP can make it easier for politicians to 
work together, undercutting the positions of hard-liners decrying compromise as sell-out (cf. 
Barry, 1975 p. 505; O’Flynn 2010).  They show that civil, constructive discussion between 
communities is not only possible but fruitful—and an aid to mutual understanding.  Even in 
deeply divided societies, it seems, mass deliberation, structured in this fashion, can be helpful.
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Figure 1 
Directions of Change and Convergence/Divergence 
 
A.  Groups Change in the Same Direction but Diverge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B.  Groups Change in the Same Direction and Converge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C.  Groups Change in the Opposite Direction but Converge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D.  Groups Change in the Opposite Direction and Diverge 
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Note:  Ct and Pt are the Catholic and Protestant group means at time t (= 1, 2) (or T1 and 
T2, in the notation of the text).  In all these diagrams, the order of the group means 
remains the same over t, namely P1 > C1 and P2 > C2.  But all four combinations can also 
obtain when the order of the group means changes over t (say P1 > C1 but C2 > P2).  We 
have not bothered to illustrate that case, given its rarity. 
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Table 1 
Knowledge Gains, T1 –T2 
Item (identified by right answer) T1 T2 T2-T1 p 
5-10% of majority-Protestant/-Catholic 
schools have at least 10% of other religion 
.242 .355 .113 .026 
The number of children entering Omagh 
schools has decreased by 10% 
.185 .476 .290 .000 
The new entitlement framework requires that 
all 14-year-olds be provided a choice of at 
least 24 subjects  
.210 .750 .540 .000 
The new entitlement framework requires that 
1/3 of all the subjects offered be applied 
.290 .629 .339 .000 
About 3/4 of grammar school pupils attend 
university after leaving school 
.290 .435 .145 .002 
School funding is currently greater for older 
pupils 
.226 .790 .565 .000 
The official employer for all teachers in 
voluntary grammar schools is the school’s 
Board of Governors 
.081 .089 .008 .783 
     
Knowledge index (% Correct) .218 .503 .286 .000 
Note: n = 124.
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Table 2 
School Policy Attitudes, T1 – T2 
 T1 p T2 p T2 – T1 p 
Age-Grouping       
Keeping the traditional pattern of schools for ages 11-
18 and 11-16 
.734 .000 .615 .000 -.119 .002 
Having most schools 11-16 and converting one or two 
schools into 16-18 Sixth Form Colleges 
.639 .000 .532 .243 -.107 .002 
Switching to a system of junior and senior high schools 
for ages 11-14 and 14-18 
.581 .008 .630 .000 .048 .241 
Having schools combining primary and post-primary 
pupils, e.g., ages 7-14 
.431 .030 .405 .003 -.026 .476 
       
School Types       
Having both academic schools and technical/ 
vocational schools  
.792 .000 .758 .000 -.034 .255 
Having a system of specialist schools, for, e.g., 
language, science, or technology 
.630 .000 .619 .000 -.011 .741 
Having a system of all-ability schools, all providing the 
same broad curriculum 
.718 .000 .667 .000 -.05 .132 
       
School Collaboration       
Getting schools to share facilities like a technology lab 
or a sixth form 
.725 .000 .758 .000 .032 .331 
Getting schools to share a campus while still retaining 
distinct identities 
.675 .000 .597 .002 -.078 .018 
Getting pupils to travel to nearby schools for subjects 
unavailable at their own 
.614 .001 .623 .000 .009 .799 
Getting teachers to travel to nearby schools to teach 
subjects unavailable there 
.658 .000 .643 .000 -.015 .651 
       
Religious Mixing        
Retaining all school types currently in the Omagh area .701 .000 .605 .000 -.096 .004 
Requiring partnering with the closest nearby school, 
regardless of religious composition 
.655 .000 .725 .000 .070 .028 
Requiring unmixed schools to partner with a school 
with children of a different religion 
.650 .000 .622 .000 -.028 .399 
At least sometimes teaching the pupils from partnering 
schools of differing religious composition in the same 
classroom 
.771 .000 .780 .000 .008 .759 
Establishing schools jointly managed by the Catholic 
Church and the Western Education and Library Board 
or Protestant churches 
.658 .000 .633 .000 -.025 .477 
Increasing the number of formal Integrated schools .745 .000 .725 .000 -.020 .476 
Note:  The p values for T1 and T2 refer to the null hypothesis of the mean’s being .5.  For T2 – 
T1, they refer to the null hypothesis of no change.  The n’s range from 108 to 121.
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 Table 3 
School Policy Attitudes, Catholic vs. Protestant Participants, T1 – T2 
 T1 T2 T2 – T1 
 C P P-C p C P P-C p C p P p P-C p P - C  
Age-Grouping                
Keeping the traditional pattern of schools 
for ages 11-18 and 11-16 
.737 .728 -.009 .870 .653 .559 -.094 .169 -.084 .064 -.169 .014 -.085 .287 .085 
Having most schools 11-16 and 
converting one or two schools into 16-18 
Sixth Form Colleges 
.626 .645 .019 .736 .503 .578 .075 .193 -.123 .006 -.068 .253 .055 .448 .056 
Switching to a system of junior and 
senior high schools for ages 11-14 and 
14-18 
.585 .566 -.020 .758 .604 .655 .051 .487 .019 .698 .089 .244 .070 .438 .031 
Having schools combining primary and 
post-primary pupils, e.g., ages 7-14  
.441 .408 -.033 .623 .394 .411 .016 .810 -.046 .298 .003 .969 .049 .551 -.017 
                
School Types                
Having both academic schools and 
technical/ vocational schools 
.780 .822 .042 .379 .780 .703 -.077 .150 .000 1.00 -.119 .007 -.119 .041 .035 
Having a system of specialist schools, 
for, e.g., language, science, or technology 
.607 .670 .064 .259 .640 .565 -.075 .177 .033 .434 -.105 .076 -.139 .056 .011 
Having a system of all-ability schools, all 
providing the same broad curriculum 
.700 .739 .039 .529 .662 .658 -.003 .962 -.038 .347 -.081 .217 -.042 .580 -.036 
                
School Collaboration                
Getting schools to share facilities like a 
technology lab or a sixth form 
.735 .695 -.040 .481 .768 .729 -.039 .452 .033 .444 .034 .531 .001 .990 -.001 
Getting schools to share a campus while 
still retaining distinct identities 
.687 .646 -.042 .467 .601 .595 -.007 .916 -.086 .046 -.051 .351 .035 .616 -.035 
Getting pupils to travel to nearby schools 
for subjects unavailable at their own 
.568 .687 .119 .066 .628 .605 -.023 .716 .060 .215 -.082 .166 -.142 .063 -.096 
Getting teachers to travel to nearby 
schools to teach subjects unavailable 
there 
.630 .707 .077 .207 .647 .633 -.015 .800 .017 .706 -.075 .131 -.092 .169 -.062 
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Religious Mixing                 
Retaining all school types currently in the 
Omagh area 
.703 .686 -.016 .757 .655 .522 -.134 .025 -.047 .233 -.165 .006 -.117 .091 .118 
Requiring partnering with the closest 
nearby school, regardless of religious 
composition 
.661 .612 -.050 .396 .744 .678 -.066 .284 .082 .063 .066 .124 -.016 .785 .016 
Requiring unmixed schools to partner 
with a school with children of a different 
religion 
.635 .658 .023 .702 .618 .618 .000 1.00 -.016 .693 -.039 .493 -.023 .745 -.023 
At least sometimes teaching the pupils 
from partnering schools of differing 
religious composition in the same 
classroom 
.801 .705 -.096 .052 .789 .750 -.039 .453 -.010 .778 .053 .291 .062 .300 .006 
Establishing schools jointly managed by 
the Catholic Church and the Western 
Education and Library Board or 
Protestant churches 
.694 .597 -.097 .099 .669 .568 -.101 .090 -.025 .569 -.029 .645 -.004 .963 .004 
Increasing the number of formal 
Integrated schools 
.769 .697 -.072 .187 .723 .726 .003 .955 -.046 .238 .029 .452 .075 .170 -.069 
Note: n’s range from 68 to 78 for Catholics and from 36 to 40 for Protestants.
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Table 4 
Inter-Community Beliefs and Attitudes 
A.  Perceptions of and Feelings toward the Other Community, T1 – T2 
 T1 T2 T2 – T1 
 Mean p Mean p Mean p 
       
How open to reason?       
P re C  .560 .053 .554 .158 -.006 .885 
C re P .543 .209 .660 .000 .118 .003 
(P re C) - (C re P) .017 .701 -.106 .030 -.123 .027 
       
How trustworthy?        
P re C .642 .000 .711 .000 .069 .113 
C re P .621 .000 .709 .000 .087 .003 
(P re C) - (C re P) .020 .635 .003 .958 -.018 .732 
       
Feeling favorably vs. unfavorably       
       
P re C .654 .000 .683 .000 .029 .399 
C re P .768 .000 .751 .000 -.016 .556 
(P re C) - (C re P) -.113 .014 -.068 .143 .045 .304 
 
B.  Beliefs about Inter-Community Relations 
 T1 T2 T2 – T1 
 Mean p Mean p Mean p 
Important to attend schools with balanced enrollment       
All .730 .000 .735 .000 .003 .897 
P .746 .000 .751 .000 .005 .910 
C .722 .000 .727 .000 .005 .875 
P –C .025 .675 .024 .680 .000 .996 
Changes in the education system can equally benefit 
children from both communities  
      
All .574 .017 .642 .000 .073 .048 
P .627 .016 .670 .001 .043 .437 
C .545 .247 .627 .004 .082 .101 
P –C .082 .196 .043 .487 .039 .601 
       
More mixing vs. more separation will improve relations        
All .723 .000 .737 .000 .013 .617 
P .770 .000 .797 .000 .028 .476 
C .699 .000 .705 .000 .007 .859 
P –C .071 .172 .092 .073 -.021 .695 
       
Mixed education promotes mutual respect & understanding       
All .793 .000 .791 .000 -.002 .933 
P .825 .000 .788 .000 -.038 .467 
C .776 .000 .793 .000 .016 .567 
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P –C .049 .263 -.005 .921 .054 .360 
C.  Perceptions of the Other Side’s Beliefs 
 T1 T2 T2 – T1 
 Mean p Mean p Mean p 
Important to attend schools with balanced enrollment       
P re C  .525 .511 .516 .721 -.009 .855 
C re P .425 .032 .525 .489 .100 .009 
(P re C) - (C re P) .100 .052 -.009 .868 -.109 .086 
       
Changes in the education system can equally benefit 
children from both communities 
      
P re C .533 .280 .541 .408 .007 .881 
C re P .553 .131 .485 .698 -.067 .162 
(P re C) - (C re P) -.019 .673 .055 .369 .075 .279 
       
More mixing vs. more separation will improve relations       
P re C .519 .607 .506 .874 -.012 .798 
C re P .508 .793 .513 .673 .005 .906 
(P re C) - (C re P) .011 .825 -.007 .891 -.017 .785 
Note:  In part A, n’s = 68-74 for Catholics and 35-37 for Protestants.  In parts B and C, n’s = 67-
76 for Catholics and 37-40 for Protestants.     
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NOTES 
1
Or, more precisely, between two national groups, British unionists and Irish nationalists.  While 
most unionists are Protestant, and most nationalists Catholic, the conflict is more national than 
religious: it is, at bottom, a border dispute about whether Northern Ireland should remain part of 
the United Kingdom or become part of a united Ireland.  But since educational issues generally 
involve questions of religious ethos, and roughly half of the schools define themselves in 
religious terms, we use the popular shorthands ‘Protestant’ and ‘Catholic.’  
2
This last category includes special needs and Irish medium schools. See Department of 
Education (2005a).  
3
The district council area includes the town of Omagh and the surrounding hinterland. The most 
recent census was in 2001. 
4
The use of random sampling is one of the design elements distinguishing Deliberative Polling 
from the ‘dialogue’ processes described in Hickey and Mohan (2004), in which the samples are 
nonrandomly invited or self-selected.       
5
Addresses were randomly sampled from a postal address file.  Within each household, the next-
birthday method (approximating random selection) decided the parent to be interviewed.   
6
The stakeholder participants in the construction of the briefing materials and in the expert panels 
were limited to representatives of different school types.  We suspect that these processes might 
have been still more difficult, had they included politicians or policy-makers.     
7
 For greater details, see the online Appendix A at [URL deleted]. 
8
The remaining 2.5% of the participants and 5.8% of the non-participants gave some other 
response or declined to answer.  Clearly, many unionists and nationalists were effectively 
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declining to answer by saying ‘neither,’ a sign of the sensitivity of this question (see Boyle and 
Hadden, 1994, p. 33 and Taylor, 2001, p. 43 on this ‘disclosure’ phenomenon).  But the 
distribution of responses, including the ‘neither’s,’ was essentially the same for those 
interviewees who attended the event and those who did not.   
9
The most recent Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey suggests that ordinary people are 
becoming even more favorably disposed toward one another, as should be expected, as the 
conflict continues to recede (NILT 2010). 
10
Both biases are imperfections of the interview sample, rather than the recruitment from it.  
Most likely, this was the result of the relatively compressed fieldwork, which limited the number 
and spacing of callbacks.  Those needing more persistence to reach and interview—a description 
fitting both men and the less well educated—tended to go disproportionately un-interviewed.  
For more detail, see the online Appendix A at [URL deleted]. 
11
At least in this focus on policy or electoral choices, deliberation differs importantly from 
“dialogue” (as construed in e.g. Hickey and Mohan (2004)).      
12
The texts for these and all other items can be found in the T2 questionnaire in Appendix C at 
[URL deleted].  
13
Meaning, as the question text specifies, Controlled, Maintained, Voluntary, Special, and Irish 
Medium.  
14
The original scorings can be found in the questionnaire, in Appendix C.  
15
Granted, not that many parents actually send their children to mixed schools.  But it is also true 
that there are simply not enough mixed schools to go around (O’Flynn, 2009, pp. 277-278).   
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16
This is a lower proportion than in most DPs (Luskin, Hahn, and Fishkin 2007), but still 
impressive, given the context.  Where one might have expected intransigence, there was 
sometimes change.   
17
Drawing the threshold lower, at .060, adds only two weaker instances of convergence (making 
a total of three) and none of divergence (leaving the total at two).  On the idea of getting teachers 
to travel to nearby schools to teach subjects unavailable there, Protestants became distinctly less 
supportive, bringing them closer to Catholics, whose initially less supportive views did not 
change much.  On the idea of increasing the number of formally integrated schools, Catholics 
and Protestants changed their views in opposite directions, each moving (insignificantly) toward 
where the other started.  
18
The means of on other attitudinal variables related to the divide among those giving midpoint 
responses to these questions are generally much closer to the means among those giving negative 
responses than to the means among those giving positive ones.  The n’s are small, but the pattern  
suggests some veiled antipathy.        
